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OUTLOOK

Annenberg Proposal for the Reform of Libel Law:
Reform or Regression?
A Defense of the Annenberg
Libel Reform Proposal
BY RODNEY A. SMOLLA

The Case for Reform
The case for reforming the law of libel is familiar,
and fundamentally sound. The question posed by The
Annenberg Washington Program's reform proposal
is not whether libel law should be reformed, but
whether the proposal contains the right reforms.
The argument favoring reform is the most compelling if one strives to look at the current system
objectively and neutrally, without a pro-plaintiff or
pro-defendant bias. If one were starting from scratch
to design the "perfect" legal mechanism for handling libel disputes, one would never arrive at the
current system. It is costly, cumbersome, and fails
to vindicate either free speech values or the protection of reputation. The enormous defense costs of
protracted litigation exert a chilling effect on the
press, while plaintiffs are left with no meaningful
legal remedy for reputational injury.
The Defense Perspective
But what if one looks at the current system from a
more selfish viewpoint? From the perspective of the
press, for example, does the pursuit of reform make
sense? Even the simple proposition that libel law
needs reform is controversial. From the defense
view, certainly, a case may be made for the status

quo. The siege on the citadel has abated. Several
years ago, an air of crisis existed. Suits against the
press were increasing, and so were multimillion
dollar damages awards. The libel insurance market
was rapidly deteriorating. Supreme Court Justices
were hinting that Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc., and
perhaps even New York Times Co. v. Sullivan should
be reexamined. And the Sharon v. Time, Inc. and
Westmoreland v. CBS suits were in mid-swing,
seeming to symbolize the escalating libel threat.
The crisis, however, ran its course. Most media
defendants have recently experienced an easing in
the number of libel suits they are facing. Insurance
markets have adjusted. The Supreme Court in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, through none other than
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, went out of its way
to endorse the basic principles of New York Times,
Gertz, and their progeny. And the failure of either
Defense Minister Ariel Sharon or General William
Westmoreland to prevail in their suits illustrated to
Continued on page 9
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A DEFENSE
Continued from page 3
plaintiffs and the plaintiffs' bar the
futility of bucking the First
Amendment in a libel suit. Defendants had reached the winter of
their discontent.
Underlying Conditions
Still Dangerous
The case for libel reform, however, is no less compelling in 1989
than in 1986. Indeed, the time for
reform is never in the heat of a
crisis, but after it, in the quiet between storms. Defendants may
feel unthreatened at the moment,
but there is no reason whatsoever
to think that the libel crisis of three
years ago could not suddenly
reappear. Trends in litigation
come and go. Underlying conditions have not changed. Plaintiffs
are still quite capable of suing,
often for hidden agendas. Judges
are still quite capable of denying
defense motions for summary

judgment. Juries are still prone to
return large verdicts. And even
though defendants have every
reason to expect that their excellent record at the appellate level
will continue, so will the high litigation costs of a system that provides most of its defense
protection at the back end rather
than the front end, of the litigation. So even if utterly unmoved
by any feelings of sympathy for
plaintiffs, the press has every reason to thoughtfully explore reform.
States as Laboratories
But if reform makes sense in the
abstract, what about the particular? Is the Annenberg package defensible? Before turning to the
merits, a number of preliminary
points are worth making. The proposal is in the form of a model
statute. The complete statutory
text, and accompanying sectionby-section explanatory analysis,
form the heart of the report. If
nothing else, the care with which

this reform blueprint was drafted
has substantially advanced public
discussion of libel law, and helped
focus debate. The report deliberately avoids taking a position on
whether the statute should be
adopted at the state or federal
level. The group was divided on
the issue. Ultimately, one uniform
nationwide law of libel makes
sense to me, given the multistate
nature of the modern communications industry, and the fact that
there is, after all, only one First
Amendment. But as Justice Brandeis pointed out, states are ideal
laboratories for experiment in a
federal system, and the notion of
trying out the Annenberg proposal on an experimental basis at
the state level would be a sensible
way to proceed.
The Annenberg Group
Deliberative Process
Secondly, the composition of the
eleven-member group that participated in formulating the proposal is, to say the least, striking.
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How could consensus be reached
by persons as ideologically diverse as Anthony Lewis, Bruce
Fein, Richard Schmidt, and Herbert Schmertz? How could one of
General Westmoreland's former
lawyers, Anthony Murry, and ardent defense attorneys like Samuel Klein, Roslyn Mazer, and
Sandra Baron agree? When one
adds to the mix the very different
experiences of a distinguished
trial judge, Lois Forer, and a leading media insurance expert, Chad
Milton, the sweeping agreement
of the group seems even more remarkable. The end-product this
group produced is not a series of
watered-down compromises, a
string of lowest common denominators. The people in this group
were not shrinking violets. The
debate was vigorous, but thoughtful. This was no labor negotiation,
in which people came to the table
willing to treat the First Amendment like a bargaining chip. It
was, rather, a conscientious exercise in problem-solving. As Chad
Milton put it, "Many of us have
adapted to the status quo, such
that we may have a financial or
emotional attachment to it, and
there is always reluctance to try
unknown paths. In that regard,
this proposal urges us to set aside
self-interest and expediency in favor of what is, in my view, the right
thing to do."
The Right Thing to Do
Why is it "the right thing to do"?
Let me address several of the
principal objections and fears that
the report has generated. This will
be a "bipartisan" defense, discussing both plaintiff and defense
concerns.
Would the statute trigger an increase in frivolous suits? This fear
is grounded in the suspicion that
plaintiffs will file suits and immediately opt for the declaratory
judgment option, in which they no
longer face the impediment of
proving actual malice (or negligence, in private-figure cases), and
may receive the "bonus" of attorney's fees if they prevail. The fear
10 D
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is reasonable, and probably the
type of question that can never be
satisfactorily resolved until the
statute is actually enacted somewhere and tried for several years.
There are, however, reasons to
believe that the fear is unfounded.
First, it must be remembered
that every would-be plaintiff must,
within thirty days of the publication of the defamatory statement,
file a demand for a retraction or
opportunity to reply, as a prerequisite to filing suit. This request
"must specify the statements
claimed to be false and defamatory and must set forth the plaintiff's version of the facts." The
defendant then has thirty days to
respond, and may absolutely bar
litigation by honoring the defendant's request. This is a powerful
defense option, for the defendant
who has in fact been "caught redhanded" in a mistake now has the
ability to completely eliminate exposure to litigation. More significantly, when the plaintiff's only
complaint is that the published
story contained defamatory implications, the defendant may avoid
suit simply by retracting the implication.

Truth, under the Annenberg proposal, is made to
stand naked in the
declaratory judgment
procedure, without the
protective clothing of
New York Times.
Secondly, even in the absence
of a retraction or reply barring the
suit, the plaintiff faces down-side
risks of his own. The declaratory
judgment mode is not a perfectly
level playing field, but rather has
a bias designed to protect First
Amendment interests. The plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity, and must meet that burden
with "clear and convincing" evidence. Much more significantly,
the plaintiff must deal with the risk
that he will be forced to pay the
defendant's attorneys' fees if he
does not prevail.
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Third, the statute very carefully
circumscribes the range of statements that qualify as defamatory.
No statute will ever completely
solve the intractable problem of
separating statements of fact from
statements of opinion. The Annenberg proposal, however, contains an elaborate definition of
opinion that goes a long way toward insulating certain genres of
speech by presumptively classifying them as opinion, including
fiction, satire or parody, artistic,
athletic, literary, academic, culinary, theatrical, religious, or political commentary, letters to the
editor, editorials, and editorial
cartoons.
If no statute will ever eliminate
all problems of separating fact
from opinion, a statute may come
close to eliminating exposure to
suit for neutral reportage. The
proposal contains a broad neutral
reportage privilege, barring liability for the repetition of the defamatory statements of others,
when the quote is accurately reported, involves a matter of public interest, and the source is
identified. Finally, the fear of frivolous suits is mitigated by the fact
that the report requires a plaintiff
to put up or shut up. The plaintiff
must be able to articulate prior to
suit what the facts are, and must
have confidence in his or her ability to prove them. Under the current system, plaintiffs have their
own ability to hide behind New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan. They
can file suit and then blame their
failure to recover on the First
Amendment's requirement that
fault, in addition to falsity, be
demonstrated. Under the proposal, the nuisance suit carries the
risk of deeper embarrassment and
liability for attorneys' fees.
The PlaintifPs Perspective
Do plaintiffs get a fair shake under
this proposal? If defendants may
distrust the declaratory judgment
option as an invitation to frivolous suits, plaintiffs may claim foul
in the taking away of their right to
money damages in any case in
which the defendant forces the

qualified or absolute immunity be in (How can one be against
from damages, if the plaintiff pre- truth?), but despite its surface unvails on claims for injunctive or seemliness, it is an objection that
declaratory relief. The analogy is I take very seriously. For one might
apt, because immunity doctrines argue forcefully that the classic
in civil rights cases are designed Holmes/Brandeis free speech trato insulate officials from the chill- dition will not countenance goving effect of litigation, unless they ernment as truth's arbiter. The
have knowingly violated settled only test of truth is the market, and
constitutional rights. This bears a government has no business destriking resemblance to the claring it, in this libel reform stat"breathing space" rationale of ute or anywhere else.
This argument, however, proves
New York Times, and if anything,
is an even more intense commit- too much. For if followed to its
ment to avoiding "chilling ef- logical end it would unravel even
fects." Yet even in these civil the current law of libel, in which
rights cases, the Court has drawn the judicial system does, after all,
a sharp distinction between liabil- purport to pass on truth or falsity
ity for damages and liability for at- as part of the litigation. Truth, untorneys' fees.
der the Annenberg proposal, is
On a less legalistic plane, it must made to stand naked in the decbe remembered that the fault laratory judgment procedure,
standards of New York Times and without the protective clothing of
Gertz were crafted to protect First New York Times. But freedom of
Amendment values in the context speech is not left more exposed by
of a traditional common law suit this statute. When all of the profor money damages. If the net posal's provisions are taken in
"chilling effect" of all the provi- combination, free speech values
sions of the comprehensive new are enhanced, and worthy plainreform structure would be less tiffs are offered a meaningful remthan that of the old system (in- edy. The Annenberg proposal
cluding New York Times and suggests that reforming libel law
Gertz) then the fee-shifting device may not be a zero-sum game after
should be constitutional.
all. We will never find out, of
course, until some brave legislaTruth in the Marketplace
ture gives it a try.
There are many other interesting
issues posed by the proposal, and
they cannot all be addressed in
Constitutional Questions
this space. The discussion in the
Is it constitutional to expose a de- last paragraph, however, touches
fendant to liability for attorneys' on a final, more global point,
fees without the benefit of the ac- worth emphasizing in conclusion.
tual malice or negligence fault The various provisions of the proprotections of New York Times posal are meant to work together,
and Gertz? Again, this is a ques- to create a matrix of incentives
tion that cannot be answered de- that encourage both sides to exfinitively until the statute is tried amine their positions self-critiand tested in court. A number of cally, and settle in the early stages
arguments support the constitu- of the dispute. Philosophically,
tionality of the fee-shifting provi- these incentives combine to make
sions of the proposal. The closest the prompt dissemination of truth
analogy under existing law is the in the marketplace the central
Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees driving purpose of the reform. Rodney A. Smolla is the Cutler
Awards Act of 1976. In civil rights Some may object to this preoc- Professor of Law and Director of
litigation, the Supreme Court has cupation with truth, fearing that the Institute of Bill of Rights Law
held that a prevailing plaintiff may the First Amendment has been at the College of William and Mary
recover attorneys' fees even sacrificed on truth's altar. This is School of Law. He was the Direcagainst a defendant that enjoys a somewhat awkward position to tor of The Annenberg Libel Project.

case into the declaratory judgment mode. Certainly, there will
be some plaintiffs who will suffer
demonstrable damages and nonetheless be shut out by a defendant
who opts for the declaratory judgment procedure. Reforms, however, must be designed for the
large run of cases, and there are
reasons for believing that most
plaintiffs will be much better off
under the proposal. A plaintiff
who gets a speedy judicial declaration that the defamatory statements leveled against him were
false, and who gets attorneys' fees,
is better off under the proposal
than under current law. Most
plaintiffs will in fact be made
whole by such a declaratory remedy. After all appeals are exhausted, most plaintiffs lose under
existing law. Under the proposal,
those with meritorious claims on
the issue of truth or falsity will
usually win.
But why not permit plaintiffs
who prevail at the declaratory
judgment stage to still recover for
special damages-provable pecuniary losses? To permit this
would be to defeat the whole purpose of the declaratory judgment
innovation, for it would open up
every case to a mini-trial on special damages, and defeat the
streamlining purpose of the declaratory judgment procedure.
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